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757 
THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION OF LAND 
POLLUTION: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE  
ON APPLYING THE BREAKING THE 
LOGJAM PRINCIPLES TO  
WASTE MANAGEMENT 
JOHN S. APPLEGATE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professors Stewart and Adler have written thoughtfully of the 
challenges of regulating, respectively, nuclear and hazardous waste 
in an effective and efficient manner. Each points to ways in which 
application of the Breaking the Logjam principles could make 
valuable improvements in the legal regimes for these categories of 
dangerous, land-disposed waste. Stewart seeks to repair a system 
for managing numerous types of nuclear waste, which he 
regards—with justification—as largely dysfunctional.1 Adler 
argues that the system for the management of hazardous waste is 
unduly centralized and inflexible, especially since hazardous waste 
is, in his view, an essentially local and relatively contained 
environmental problem.2 This comment adds a temporal dimension 
to the consideration of both waste types. 
Unlike air and water pollution, land pollution (that is, the 
management of dangerous solid and liquid wastes on land) remains 
a relatively concentrated, active hazard for long periods of time. 
Uncontrolled, land pollution moves through the environment 
slowly and often without significant diminution of toxicity. 
Persistence, in fact, is often regarded as the defining quality of 
dangerous land pollutants.3 Even controlled, which is to say 
 
 *  Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law and Executive Associate Dean for 
Academic Affairs, Indiana University School of Law – Bloomington. 
 1 Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Nuclear Waste Law and Policy: Fixing a 
Bankrupt System, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 783 (2008). 
 2 Jonathan H. Adler, Reforming our Wasteful Hazardous Waste Policy, 17 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 724 (2008). 
 3 E.g., Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 23, 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1367903
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isolated from the environment, land pollution retains its hazardous 
qualities for long periods of time. Indeed, one of the ironies of 
hazardous waste management is that the more effectively the waste 
is isolated, the more effectively its hazardous qualities are 
protected: it can neither degrade nor disperse. (Radioactive decay 
is not slowed by isolation, of course, but neither can it be 
accelerated by natural processes.4) It is true that water pollutants 
can be deposited in sediments, that contaminants in aquifers often 
move slowly, and that air pollutants can remain in the stratosphere 
for decades—but none poses a focused threat for as long as 
hazardous and nuclear waste. Accordingly, there is no notable 
temporal dimension to air and water pollution laws or regulations, 
but hazardous and nuclear waste regulation is very much 
concerned with the problem of maintaining the isolation of solid 
and liquid materials over decades, centuries, and even millennia.5 
To say that time is a concern of hazardous and nuclear waste 
regulation is not to say, however, that regulation is particularly 
successful in addressing that concern. In fact, there is good reason 
to believe that waste management practices and institutions are not 
well designed to perform over the time periods during which the 
waste remains dangerous. In particular, institutions do not exist 
that have any kind of record of ability to monitor and safeguard 
waste material over decades, centuries, or millenia.6 The temporal 
 
2001, reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 532 (2001), available at 
http://www.pops.int/documents/convtext/convtext_en.pdf. 
 4 Techniques for transmuting radioactive waste into less dangerous isotopes 
have been suggested, but they are in the earliest stages of development. “It is 
generally agreed that it is not feasible to deal with existing waste by this process; 
the technology, if feasible, would form an intrinsic part of the fuel cycle of future 
programmes.” PETER RILEY, NUCLEAR WASTE: LAW, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM 
45 (Ashgate 2004). 
 5 See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 60.113 (2008) (requiring 300 years for package 
integrity, 1000 years for radiation leaks); 40 C.F.R. §§ 191.13–119.15 (2006) 
(requiring 10,000 years for surrounding areas for high-level waste); see also 
Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(requiring a greater than 10,000 year compliance period for the Yucca Mountain 
deep geologic repository). 
 6 John S. Applegate & Stephen Dycus, Institutional Controls or Emperor’s 
Clothes? Long-Term Stewardship of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, 28 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10631, 10639 (1998); Katherine N. Probst, Long-Term Stewardship and 
the Nuclear Weapons Complex: The Challenge Ahead, 131 RESOURCES 14, 15 
(1998); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, LONG-TERM INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT 
OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY LEGACY WASTE SITES (2000). The track record 
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dimension of waste management thus presents a particularly 
interesting occasion to apply the Breaking the Logjam regulatory 
principles that Professors Stewart, Schoenbrod, and Wyman have 
developed.7 Specifically, consideration of the long-term nature of 
waste disposal offers important opportunities to apply cross-
cutting regulatory approaches that address underlying causes. The 
principle of expanding the use of market incentives and 
information may be particularly useful in accomplishing this 
objective. The temporal dimension also offers an opportunity to 
insist on openness about trade-offs, and decision making will 
undoubtedly benefit from an informed, transparent, and 
deliberative approach. The temporal aspect presents a conceptual 
challenge, however, to scaling regulatory authority to the problem. 
These comments conclude with the suggestion of an additional 
principle of institutional learning and the conservation of options. 
In any long-term effort one must expect that over time we will 
come to understand a problem better and so develop better ideas 
for addressing it. These improvements can only be implemented if 
the regulatory system is capable of learning and if decisions now 
leave open options for the future. 
I. RISK, COST, AND TIME 
The salience of temporal concerns in the management of 
nuclear and hazardous waste has important consequences for their 
management. These wastes not only pose risks of various kinds 
and to various groups of people in the present, but also far into the 
future. The challenges of long-term management of waste have 
been most extensively explored in the context of nuclear waste, 
perhaps because we are accustomed to thinking about nuclear 
waste in terms of time, that is, half lives. However, time is at least 
as important to other hazardous wastes. Radioactive substances 
decay—albeit usually over centuries or millennia—but other 
elements do not. As a result, toxic metals like nickel, mercury, 
arsenic, and lead are, for all practical purposes, forever. There are 
thousands of sites containing such “ordinary” toxic materials in 
 
of institutions in protecting even items of great value, such as texts, jewels, 
records, and artwork, is minimal, and preservation has depended primarily on 
luck. Applegate & Dycus, supra at 10645. 
 7 Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress and 
Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008). 
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significant quantities, and their long-term management receives 
almost no attention. Indeed, the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), the primary regulator of such wastes, in 
effect washes its hands of these sites a mere thirty years after 
closure.8 In sum, the longevity of both nuclear and hazardous 
waste poses serious and unique challenges to its proper 
management. 
A. The Life Cycle of Hazardous and Nuclear Waste 
Industrial waste has a life cycle that begins with the raw 
materials that go into a manufacturing or other industrial process, 
continues through the design and operation of the process itself, 
then the generation of the waste products, the treatment (if any) of 
the waste, the storage and transportation of the waste, disposal on 
land, and finally remediation of ineffective disposal.9 Adjustments 
at any of these phases of the life cycle can have important 
downstream effects on the volume and characteristics—indeed, on 
the existence—of the resulting waste and its human health and 
environmental consequences. For example, choice of raw materials 
or process design changes can eliminate a component that 
contributes to the hazard of the resulting waste. Minimization of 
the use of chlorine is often advocated for precisely this reason, 
since chlorine is a kind of radix malorum of many persistent 
hazardous pollutants. Likewise, more efficient use of raw materials 
in the production process itself can reduce their presence in waste, 
as many companies have found by doing careful analyses of 
inputs, processes, and wastes.10 Moreover, it is universally agreed 
that, all other things being equal, it is both cheaper and more 
effective to avoid creation of the waste in the first place than to 
manage it after it has been created. 
Federal and state waste management laws and regulations are 
overwhelmingly concerned with the phases of the life cycle after 
 
 8 40 C.F.R. § 264.117(a) (2007). 
 9 Our present concern is disposal on land. See generally JOHN S. APPLEGATE 
& JAN G. LAITOS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: RCRA, CERCLA, AND THE 
MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 18–20 (Foundation Press 2006). 
 10 See generally Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series 
Environmental Management Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to 
Government Regulation?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 237 (2000) (describing the use of an 
international standard for measuring inputs and waste outputs). 
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the waste is generated. With the exception of the voluntary 
programs under the Pollution Prevention Act11 and the occasional 
state law,12 they are concerned with the fate of wastes that already 
exist. The management system under RCRA13 often styles itself as 
cradle-to-grave regulation, because it tracks waste from its creation 
to disposal. However, Professor Gaba has correctly observed that 
this is really “deathbed to grave” regulation, because early 
opportunities to reduce or eliminate the generation of the waste are 
almost entirely ignored.14 
To extend the metaphor, the afterlife of waste—
remediation—is addressed in great detail and at enormous expense 
in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund).15 CERCLA’s 
prehistory is the disposal of hazardous waste on land in a way that 
did not, as it turns out, effectively isolate it.16 This leads to a 
polluted present in which the current condition of the land includes 
the presence of non-isolated wastes. In CERCLA terminology, this 
constitutes a “release” of a hazardous substance, which triggers 
response authorities.17 The response authorities include a range of 
activities of shorter or longer duration and short- or long-term 
objectives, which are needed to destroy, isolate, or re-isolate the 
waste. The objectives are established with reference to the 
expected condition and use of the land immediately following 
remediation and for the near-term future. Thus, EPA and other 
agencies consider the extent of predicted future human exposure 
patterns in assessing the appropriate nature and extent of 
remediation. For example, industrial re-use (“brownfields”) 
necessitates a less extensive clean-up because such a use results in 
lower exposure levels to persons at the site and thus lower risks to 
 
 11 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101–13109 (2000). 
 12 E.g., Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21I, 
§§ 1–23 (2004 & Supp. 2006). 
 13 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992(k) (2000). 
 14 Jeffrey M. Gaba, Solid Waste and Recycled Materials Under RCRA: 
Separating Chaff from Wheat, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623, 651 (1989). 
 15 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000). 
 16 See Applegate & Dycus, supra note 6; John S. Applegate & Steven M. 
Wesloh, Short Changing Short-Term Risk: A Study of Superfund Remedy 
Selection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 270 (1998). 
 17 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(22) (2000) (definition of “release”); 42 U.S.C. § 
9604(a)(1) (2000) (response authorities). 
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them.18 Finally, “long-term stewardship” means long-term 
management of the remaining contamination or waste to assure its 
continuing isolation to protect human health and the environment. 
The general rule also applies to the grave and afterlife, that it 
is both cheaper and more effective to avoid waste production in the 
first place. Waste that does not escape does not have to be cleaned 
up, and so better management and control practices at the earlier 
stages are greatly preferred to remediation. Even though most 
wastes cannot be made to disappear entirely, because elements 
cannot practically be destroyed, isolating them, gathering them 
into a well defined location, treating them for stability, and 
controlling access will result in a safer near-term and more reliable 
long-term future. 
B. Waste Management Options 
One of the strongest arguments for addressing waste early in 
its life cycle is that the basic options for managing waste are 
actually quite limited. In contrast, reformulating products, 
redesigning processes, finding substitute inputs, and finding 
substitute products can all eliminate or reduce the generation or 
degree of hazard from waste. Thus, waste minimization at the 
earliest phases of the life cycle—selection of raw materials and 
design of production processes—can be the most cost-effective 
methods of reducing risk from waste management, even though it 
has little to do with waste management per se. (Control at the 
back-end of the cycle only indirectly encourages waste 
minimization by raising the cost of management.) However, direct 
control of the early life cycle stages would involve a level of 
detailed involvement in production processes that is rare in 
American environmental regulation. 
Once the waste is generated, the first-order options consist of 
isolation, treatment, and release into the environment (without 
treatment). Isolation can involve anything from dumping in a 
trench behind the factory (as described in A Civil Action,19 for 
example), to dumping in an apparently suitable location (e.g., Love 
 
 18 See generally John S. Applegate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and 
Environmental Justice: Evaluating the Brownfields Bargain, 13 J. NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 243 (1997–98). 
 19 JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (Vintage Books 1995). 
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Canal20), to disposal in a state-of-the-art waste disposal facility. In 
all cases, the objective is to keep the waste in place and away from 
humans and the ambient environment for as long as it remains 
hazardous. Untreated release is the opposite of isolation, and it 
covers a range of activities from careless or willfully irresponsible 
disposal (as alleged in A Civil Action) to a deliberate effort to 
manage safely through dilution. A septic field is an example of the 
latter, but the safety of this technique for biological hazards 
contrasts with the use of a similar method for diluting radioactive 
waste, which left a legacy of widespread contamination of soil and 
groundwater.21 
Treatment encompasses a wider array of physical techniques. 
Many, many treatment technologies exist, but all are designed to 
accomplish one of three second-order objectives: to destroy the 
waste, to render it safe for release into the environment, or to 
render it more capable of effective isolation. Destruction of waste 
usually means changing its physical form so that it is separated 
into non-toxic constituent parts. Incineration, for example, results 
in air emissions and ash, which are supposed to pose no further (or 
more controllable) hazard. Rendering safe for release into the 
environment often overlaps with destruction. Destructive treatment 
typically results in hazardous and non-hazardous fractions. The 
non-hazardous fraction can be released to the environment, and the 
hazardous fraction is isolated. Treatment is also used to change the 
form or characteristics of waste so that it (or some fraction of it) is 
suitable for isolation, that is, so that it will stay put. This involves 
treatment to reduce volume, mobility, or a hazardous characteristic 
(e.g., toxicity) of the waste, with the objective that it would be 
easier to isolate (for example, there is less of it) and, if isolation 
failed, would either move slowly through the environment (less 
mobile) or would be less dangerous to health or the environment 
(less toxic). This is the philosophy behind the 1984 “land ban” 
amendments to RCRA, which prohibit land disposal of hazardous 
waste unless it has been treated to reduce volume, mobility, or 
toxicity.22 
 
 20 United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 850 F. Supp. 993, 997 
(W.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 21 ROY E. GEPHART, HANFORD: A CONVERSATION ABOUT NUCLEAR WASTE 
AND CLEANUP 5.26–5.30 (Battelle Press 2003). 
 22 42 U.S.C. § 6924(c)–(g). 
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Waste management always involves one or more of the first-
order options, often in combination, and deploys a wide range of 
second-order physical techniques. The essential point is that total 
destruction is relatively rare (thanks to the physical laws of 
conservation of matter), and so it is more common to use methods 
that reduce the volume or the mobility or the toxicity of a 
hazardous fraction of the wastes in order to render isolation of the 
hazardous fraction more secure. The latter methods improve 
safety, but they leave a legacy for future generations. 
C. Isolation Over Time 
Unless a waste can be treated in a way that destroys it or 
allows it to be freely released into the environment, it must be 
isolated, and isolation is the primary focus of the current 
regulatory schemes for hazardous and nuclear waste. They specify 
the kinds of wastes that can be isolated (e.g., only after 
treatment),23 the locations where they may be isolated,24 and the 
specifications of the facilities where they may be isolated.25 (They 
also address intermediate management activities such as 
transportation and temporary storage.) Since isolation only works 
if it is effective over the period of time during which the waste 
material remains dangerous, the problem of long-term isolation 
drove the 1984 RCRA “land ban” for hazardous waste. EPA and 
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) took the view, and 
Congress agreed, that it is only a matter of time before virtually all 
isolation systems fail and the hazardous materials in them are 
released into the environment.26 Worse, such releases are likely to 
be unplanned and even undetected at the time. The land ban’s 
 
 23 E.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 268 (2007) (land disposal restrictions);10 C.F.R. § 61.1 
(2008) (applicability); 10 C.F.R. § 61.55 (2008) (waste classification). 
 24 E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 264.18 (2007) (general standards; specific standards in 
following sections of pt. 264; 10 C.F.R. §§ 60.121, 60.122, 61.50–61.59 (2008) 
(high-level waste, ownership of high-level waste and other radioactive waste, 
respectively). 
 25 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o) (2000) (minimum technological requirements); 
40 C.F.R. §§ 264.300–264.317 (2007) (same; hazardous waste landfills); 10 
C.F.R. §§ 60.111–60.113 (2008) (high-level waste); 10 C.F.R. § 61.51 (2008) 
(design standards). 
 26 APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 9, at 12–16, 75–83; OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR 
HAZARDOUS WASTE (1983) [hereinafter OTA]. 
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treatment requirement was intended to reduce toxicity and/or 
exposure (i.e., mobility) of such releases, thereby reducing risks 
when such releases inevitably occur. The 1986 amendments to 
CERCLA provide a litany of similar concerns: 
 
 
 
In assessing alternative remedial actions, the President shall, at 
a minimum, take into account: 
(A) the long-term uncertainties associated with land disposal; 
(B) the goals, objectives, and requirements of the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act [RCRA]; 
(C) the persistence, toxicity, mobility, and propensity to 
bioaccumulate of such hazardous substances and their 
constituents; 
(D) short- and long-term potential for adverse health effects 
from human exposure; 
(E) long-term maintenance costs; 
(F) the potential for future remedial action costs if the 
alternative remedial action in question were to fail; and 
(G) the potential threat to human health and the environment 
associated with excavation, transportation, and redisposal, or 
containment. 
The President shall select a remedial action that is protective of 
human health and the environment, that is cost effective, and 
that utilizes permanent solutions and alternative treatment 
technologies or resource recovery technologies to the maximum 
extent practicable.27 
Since CERCLA is by definition all about failed isolation, it is 
no surprise that Congress, in establishing clean-up standards under 
CERCLA, made avoiding future failures its central concern.28 
The length of time that an isolation system retains its integrity 
depends on several factors: the characteristics of the waste (a 
corrosive waste would degrade containers more quickly), the 
initial design and construction of the isolation system, and the 
continuing monitoring and repair of the isolation system. Deep 
 
 27 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1). 
 28 See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND 
STRATEGY (1985) (criticizing a policy of containing rather than treating 
hazardous wastes to avoid future clean-up sites). 
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geologic repositories like Yucca Mountain and the Waste Isolation 
Pilot Plant (WIPP), for example, are or will be constructed in such 
a way that no further human interaction will ever be necessary (or 
even feasible).29 An alternative strategy, monitored retrievable 
storage, assumes a constant low level of monitoring activity and 
regular human intervention (at about century-long intervals) over 
the course of millennia to repackage the material.30 Even 
aspirationally permanent solutions like Yucca Mountain and WIPP 
will require very long-term stewardship arrangements to prevent 
intrusion through, for example, mining.31 
There is, generally speaking, an inverse relationship between 
the resources invested in the early management of waste and the 
resources required to maintain isolation. As with so much in life, it 
is a matter of paying now or paying later. At the simplest level, 
investment in an elaborate, RCRA-compliant hazardous waste 
facility now will reduce the likelihood of leakage, extend the 
effective life of the facility, and alert watchers to leakage shortly 
after it occurs—all of which will minimize the costs of responding 
to the eventual loss of integrity of the facility. In 1983, OTA 
estimated that “years or decades from now, cleaning up a site from 
which there are hazardous releases, and compensating victims, 
might cost 10 to 100 times the additional costs incurred today to 
prevent releases.”32 Likewise, the better designed and constructed 
the isolation system is, the less or less frequent ongoing care—
monitoring, repair, clean-up, re-isolation—will be required. 
Nevertheless, even the most elaborately designed system will 
require some minimal attention as long as the waste is dangerous, 
if only to prevent intrusion by animals, plants, geologic events, 
hydrologic events, or human activity. An analogy to preventive 
maintenance is apt: it is far less expensive in the long run to keep 
up with the needed maintenance, than to let the facility get to the 
point of structural damage. 
 
 29 For more about these repositories, see sources cited in Applegate & Dycus, 
supra note 6, at 10634 n.17 (citing sources). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Figuring out how to warn people thousands of years in the future is a 
fascinating endeavor. An excellent, accessible account of the issues can be found 
in GREGORY BENFORD, DEEP TIME: HOW HUMANITY COMMUNICATES ACROSS 
MILLENNIA (Avon 1999). 
 32 OTA, supra note 26, at 6. 
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D. Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Management Decisions 
The foregoing discussion has fundamental implications for the 
management of hazardous and nuclear waste. First, the advantages 
in cost and environmental protection of reducing waste at or close 
to the source—that is, as early in the life cycle as possible—are, if 
anything, understated by the common wisdom. Hazardous and 
nuclear wastes are forever, and without some level of long-term 
monitoring and control, they will simply reappear again (and 
again) as a problem for future generations. 
Second, we cannot make the wastes that have already been 
generated entirely disappear. We must in candor recognize that 
irretrievable decisions have been made, which take contaminated 
land and waste disposal areas out of productive circulation for 
many uses, also forever. Any waste that we leave behind, in 
whatever configuration, imposes some level of burden on future 
generations at least to monitor and isolate it, and perhaps to 
manage it actively. 
Third, there are, however, opportunities to limit the burden in 
the waste management choices that we make now. Investments in 
aggressive management will, as a general rule, result in lower 
long-term costs and less burden on future generations. 
Fourth, these are not simple decisions. A thoughtful approach 
to waste management policy must consider opportunities to 
minimize the problem, current risks and costs, and effects far into 
the future. Hazardous and nuclear waste does not lend itself to 
absolute rules, nor does it lend itself to simple formulas for 
arriving at appropriate solutions. There are trade-offs aplenty—
among future land uses, types of risks, persons at risk, and above 
all the timing of risks—and none are subject to simple 
quantification or comparison. The management of these wastes is, 
in short, an excellent candidate for applying and assessing the 
Breaking the Logjam principles. 
II. TIME AND THE BREAKING THE LOGJAM PRINCIPLES 
The safe management of hazardous and nuclear waste 
implicates several of the Breaking the Logjam principles, as 
Professors Stewart and Adler explain in their papers. The 
principles have additional implications when the temporal 
dimension of waste management is considered. In addition, the 
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temporal dimension suggests the value of an additional principle, 
institutional learning and the conservation of options, for 
regulatory decision making. 
A. Cross-Cutting Regulatory Approaches that  
Address Underlying Causes 
The principle that “existing statutes must be restructured to 
match the true character of environmental problems and their 
underlying causes” matches perfectly the observation that the best 
way to deal with wastes is not to generate them in the first place. 
An effective hazardous waste policy must focus on the true cradle 
of the waste, its underlying cause: the decisions that led to its 
creation in the first place. The decisions to make a product or to 
perform an activity at all (or in a certain amount), to formulate the 
product or to design the activity in a certain way, and to design the 
production process in a particular way, all affect the volume and 
nature of the resulting waste streams. Such changes to the early 
parts of the life cycle will not eliminate all hazardous and nuclear 
waste, of course, but waste minimization must be the foundation of 
the regulatory scheme. 
The fundamental difficulty in developing effective waste 
minimization programs is gaining regulatory access, so to speak, to 
the early production decisions. In general, governmental regulation 
focuses on the externalities of enterprises. Externalities offer the 
best justification for imposing collective public controls, and they 
are the most politically acceptable interventions. For example, 
much of the resistance to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
which has left it largely inactive,33 is founded on the idea that 
government should not regularly go “inside” business operations; 
its focus should be on controlling external effects. Whatever the 
merits of this view, it was implicitly supported by the differential 
treatment of workplace inspections and ambient pollution: the 
former requires a warrant, and the latter can be warrantlessly 
observed and sampled at the fenceline.34 Moreover, the internal 
 
 33 See THOMAS O. MCGARITY AND SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: 
THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION 3–30 (Praeger 1993). 
 34 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237–38 (1986); Marshall 
v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978); Air Pollution Variance Bd. of 
Colorado v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974); see also Cary 
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operations of economic enterprises are extremely various. The 
familiarity of the enterprise’s management is particularly valuable 
with respect to operational choices and designs; conversely, 
external regulators are most likely to err in creating detailed 
requirements in these areas. It would be silly to abjure all 
regulation of enterprises’ internal operations—and environmental, 
health, and safety laws wisely do not do so—but the internal-
external divide poses a real challenge for addressing “underlying 
causes” of hazardous waste disposal on land. 
As a result, federal legislation on waste minimization and 
pollution prevention is basically voluntary. The Pollution 
Prevention Act,35 for example, recognizes the value of addressing 
the early life cycle of pollutants, but does little more than offer 
weak incentives to develop and implement waste minimization.36 
RCRA requires certain waste generators to have waste 
minimization plans in place.37 The most effective systems have 
instead attacked the problem indirectly—from the outside, so to 
speak. “Reputation tax”38 systems publicize the hazardous 
emissions of a facility or hazardous contents of a product, with the 
expectation that such publicity will create a strong incentive to 
eliminate or reduce the hazardous discharges or contents. The 
Toxics Release Inventory established by the 1986 amendments to 
CERCLA (the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act (EPCRA)) required industrial facilities to disclose their 
releases of significant amounts of designated hazardous substances 
into any medium,39 and industry reacted to the publicity by 
reducing such releases.40 The means of achieving the reductions 
 
Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOCIETY REV. 691 (2003) 
(describing the difficulties of regulating “inside” an enterprise). 
 35 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101–13109 (2000). 
 36 See Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The 1990 Pollution 
Prevention Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 170–174, 188–189 (1992). 
 37 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922(b), 6925(h). 
 38 See John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and 
Demand for Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008). 
 39 42 U.S.C. § 11023. 
 40 See JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE 
ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND IMPACTS OF THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM 
225–26 (Cambridge U. Press 2005); David W. Case, Corporate Environmental 
Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 
U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 381–82 (2005). 
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are nowhere stated in the statute or regulations; they were entirely 
in the hands of the enterprises themselves. 
California’s Proposition 6541 imposes a similar notification 
requirement for chemicals “known to the state to cause cancer or 
reproductive toxicity” when they are released to the air, 
groundwater, or contained in products. Even though it, too, does 
not mandate any production process or input, the enactment of 
Proposition 65 has resulted in abandonment of marginal products, 
reformulations, and dramatic reductions in emissions and 
contents—exactly the kinds of decisions that waste minimization 
programs hope to affect.42 The Massachusetts Toxics Use 
Reduction Act addresses planning more directly by requiring the 
manufacturers and users of toxic chemicals to generate use-
reduction plans. While the plans need neither be followed nor 
publicly disclosed, the investment in the development of the plans 
is expected to encourage their implementation.43 
Breaking the Logjam. Two specific policy devices can be 
deployed to encourage addressing hazardous waste at its source or 
as far upstream as possible. The first and more aggressive is an 
outright ban on the substances that constitute or contribute to much 
of the hazardous waste problem. Despairing of the “fine-tuning” 
approach to toxic water pollutants, Professor Oliver Houck 
concluded: 
The near-routine predictions of layoffs, plant closings, and 
economic ruin notwithstanding, when the paper industry has 
had, at last, to convert to a less polluting process, it has done so. 
At bottom, the struggle is not over the ability not to pollute, but 
over lead time and competitiveness. Any solution to toxic 
pollution will have to accommodate these legitimate industry 
needs. A solution, on the other hand, that fosters differing state 
standards and differing state applications of these standards 
breeds uncertainty, contention, unfairness, and endless 
 
 41 Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Proposition 65), 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–25249.13 (West 2006). 
 42 See Carl Cranor, Information Generation and Use Under Proposition 65: 
Model Provisions for Other Postmarket Laws?, 83 IND. L.J. 609, 613 (2008); 
Clifford Rechtschaffen & Patrick Williams, The Continued Success of 
Proposition 65 in Reducing Toxic Exposures, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,850 (ENVTL. 
L. INST. 2005); David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed 
Facts, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,232 (2002). 
 43 Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 34, at 700. 
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opposition.44 
The device of prohibition with lead time for adjustment is 
responsible for two of the most celebrated successes of 
environmental regulation: lead in gasoline and ozone depleting 
substances. The choice of target substances must be a careful one, 
of course. For example, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants (POPs) adopts an outright ban on eleven of the 
so-called Dirty Dozen, which reflects steps already taken in most 
industrialized countries. However, it extends (indefinitely with 
regular review) the lead time for a total phase-out of DDT which, 
despite its notoriety, remains an essential element of the fight 
against malaria in the developing world.45 A place to begin the 
process of identifying phase-out candidates for hazardous waste 
would be the substances (primarily chemical and petroleum 
feedstocks) targeted by the tax that originally created the 
Superfund,46 because that list was designed to match (roughly) 
clean-up expenditures—that is, the very last stage of the hazardous 
waste life cycle—with their ultimate sources.47 
A second and less aggressive approach would be a direct 
monetary tax on the model of the reputation tax described above. 
Numerous observers have advocated a “tail-end” waste tax as a 
way to reduce upstream waste generation. Twenty-five years ago, 
the OTA suggested a variable fee (based on the likelihood of 
requiring later clean-up) as a way to reduce Superfund 
expenditures.48 Subsequent commentators have noted that tax 
systems are relatively simple and cheap to operate, they afford 
nearly total flexibility to generators to determine how and how 
much to reduce waste generation, they provide a continuing 
incentive to reduce and innovate, and the tax rates can be adjusted 
 
 44 Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean 
Water Act, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,528, 10,554 (1991); see also SIDNEY A. 
SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A 
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 158–72 (Stanford U. Press 2003) (recommending “back-
end adjustments,” rigorous general controls subject to specific modification as 
needed). 
 45 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, supra note 3, at 
annex B, part II. 
 46 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 4661, 9507. The taxes have since expired. 
 47 See generally Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 376 (1986) (holding 
that the Superfund tax preempts certain state clean-up taxes). 
 48 OTA, supra note 26, at 30–33. 
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over time to respond to the system’s success vel non in reducing 
waste.49 Moreover, a tax system can be combined effectively with 
other techniques. For example, the effect of a tax could be 
intensified by offering “rebates” for preferred or demonstrably 
superior forms of treatment and disposal.50 Combinations can also 
remedy problems that taxes are not good at achieving, such as 
avoidance of concentrations of risk51 and establishing minimum 
standards for disposal (which are related problems), and it is 
entirely possible to combine systems to address these problems. 
For example, it is entirely feasible to establish “command and 
control” disposal technology standards, while relying on a tax 
system to reduce waste generation. 
The waste or reputation tax approach not only implements the 
Breaking the Logjam principle of addressing underlying causes, 
but it also exemplifies the principle that “new statutes and 
regulatory programs need to harness the power of markets and 
information disclosure to increase environmental protection.” Like 
taxes, the EPCRA and California disclosure systems allow the 
underlying activity to continue at any level (or none) that the 
enterprise chooses, but there is a distinct cost (in reputation) 
associated with it. Acceptable products, appropriate raw materials, 
and production process are all left to the individual enterprise, 
giving them the maximum flexibility to organize their operations 
most efficiently. 
 
 49 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlman, Combating Global 
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming 
than Cap and Trade 37–47 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 117, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1109167; Robert W. Hahn, 
An Evaluation of Options for Reducing Hazardous Waste, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 201, 219 (1988); Clifford S. Russell, Economic Incentives in the 
Management of Hazardous Waste, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 257 (1988); Richard 
B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 
21, 99–100 (2001); see also Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the 
Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 566–76 (2007) 
(pointing out that tax systems are not purely market mechanisms, because they 
require governmental decisions concerning appropriate rates). 
 50 See Stewart, supra note 49; Russell, supra note 49. The tax-rebate 
proposal parallels Professor Karkkainen’s “flip” strategy described in his 
contribution to this symposium. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Framing Rules: 
Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 75 (2008). 
 51 Stewart, supra note 49, at 101. 
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B. Openness About Trade-Offs 
The temporal dimension also implicates the principle that 
“[n]ew statutes must acknowledge that trade-offs are inevitable 
and ensure that they are made in public view based on reliable 
information.” In addition to the contemporary trade-offs that 
Professors Stewart and Adler identify, hazardous and nuclear 
waste management involves trade-offs among the present and the 
multiple futures: waste elimination or minimization through 
changes in inputs and processes; initial treatment, storage, and 
disposal; the remediation period; the foreseeable future at which 
disposal decisions are aimed; and the long-term future of 
monitoring, repair, prepackaging, or clean-up. Decisions made 
now, or postponed now, will determine who will be exposed to 
risks, which risks, and at what scale. For costs, the questions are 
who will pay and how much. 
The remediation of failed waste management is a particularly 
compelling example of trade-offs across time. EPA is required to 
balance the risks of remediation itself against eight other criteria in 
determining an appropriate clean-up remedy,52 but EPA rarely 
gives remediation risks the kind of thorough consideration that it 
does many of the other CERCLA decision making criteria.53 There 
are several likely reasons for this, such as a tendency to think of 
pollution control as a fairly simple and straightforward (if 
expensive) operation, even though that is demonstrably untrue of 
waste management. The risks to humans arise from direct exposure 
to the dangerous materials themselves (the extreme case is the 
firefighters at Chernobyl). In most cases, these exposures can be 
limited to reasonably safe levels, but at the substantial cost of 
protective equipment and work procedures that extend the length 
and complexity of the clean-up effort. Perhaps the most serious 
remediation risk, though, is participation in the ordinary 
construction and transportation activities of clean-up itself—
digging, driving, and so on. There are many valid reasons why we 
might not consider the magnitude of these risks to outweigh 
environmental harm, even if they are statistically higher than the 
toxic risk—they are voluntarily undertaken by workers, they are 
not different in kind or degree from other construction and 
 
 52 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii). 
 53 Applegate & Wesloh, supra note 16. 
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transportation risks, the present generation should restore the 
planet for future generations—but they are hardly irrelevant to 
clean-up decisions. Likewise, remediation harm to ecosystems, 
such as removing contaminated topsoil or sediments, is also 
substantial in many cases, and again there is no simple formula 
balancing them against present and future risks. The factual and 
normative complexity of these trade-offs cries out for transparent 
and well informed decisions—“made in public view based on 
reliable information,” as the Breaking the Logjam principle puts it. 
Waste management statutes like CERCLA, RCRA, and the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act tend to marginalize remediation risks, 
because the statutes themselves represent a firm commitment to 
the active management of present wastes with the objective of 
protecting future generations from the mistakes of the present and 
past generations. Turning our attention, then, to the multiple 
futures of hazardous waste, the principle trade-off is the familiar 
one that the more we do now, the less we will have to do in the 
future. Put another way, there is a direct trade-off between long-
term assurance of isolation and short-term cost.54 Aggressive 
isolation and stabilization of wastes and contamination will 
undoubtedly be more costly, but they will spare future generations 
from the necessity of themselves dealing with the waste (beyond, 
say, maintenance and monitoring of disposal facilities). By 
contrast, remedial plans that depend heavily on so-called 
institutional controls (land use controls or deed restrictions, for 
example) will require active long-term stewardship to ensure that 
the controls remain effective. Similarly, doing no more than 
capping contaminated soils in place will slow migration of 
contaminants, even substantially, but the cap not only must be 
maintained intact, but migration will ultimately require more 
aggressive measures. “Attempting to minimize present costs will 
almost certainly lead to a transfer of greater costs to the future.”55 
As with remediation risks, the foregoing are real and 
inevitable trade-offs, and one cannot say a priori that a particular 
result (now or later) is always more appropriate. Statutes like 
RCRA and CERCLA sensibly privilege long-term solutions, but 
that is mainly in order to counteract the tendency to impose risks 
 
 54 See Applegate, supra note 18. 
 55 OTA, supra note 26, at 5. 
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and costs on future generations, whether through the formal use of 
discounting procedures or the all too human temptation to put off 
today what others can do tomorrow. Professor Brown Weiss has 
written compellingly of “fairness to future generations.”56 She 
begins with the equality of generations, such that no generation 
(present or future) suffers undue hardship on account of others, 
and no generation is expected to predict the goals and values of 
others. These lead her to substantive principles of conservation of 
options, conservation of quality, and conservation of access to 
resources.57 The fundamental choices are therefore normative—
who is at risk and how much, who pays and how much. They can 
and should be informed by available information, but information 
and analytical tools will not make decisions for us. Professors 
Farber and Hemmersbaugh add the important observation that 
consideration of effects on future generations is essential to the 
long-term sustainability of current decisions.58 
Breaking the Logjam. Breaking the logjam will require 
statutory frameworks that permit the trade-off of present and future 
to be frankly considered and resolved, as well as institutions that 
are capable of addressing long-term consequences. Of the relevant 
statutes, CERCLA does the best job of expressly identifying the 
relevant criteria and giving an indication of their relative priority.59 
RCRA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations under 
the Atomic Energy Act make many of these choices through 
treatment requirements and disposal standards, but they, too, leave 
some room for consideration both in the setting of general 
standards and in their application to individual disposal decisions. 
The logjam, instead, is with regulatory decision making processes. 
Reasonably available information concerning long-term 
consequences must be gathered and disclosed, affected 
 
 56 EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 
(1989). 
 57 Id.; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, DECIDING 
FOR THE FUTURE: BALANCING RISKS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS FAIRLY ACROSS 
GENERATIONS 9–13 (1997) (setting out similar principles for intergenerational 
decision making). 
 58 See Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the 
Future: Discount Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. 
REV. 267, 293 (1993). 
 59 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b), (d) (2000). 
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stakeholders must be involved in a meaningful way, and they and 
the decision makers must expressly address the trade-offs between 
present and future in reaching a final decision.60 A good model is 
the “analytic-deliberative process” advocated by the National 
Academy of Sciences for risk-based decisions.61 Scientific analysis 
(and, in the case of future effects, predictions) are developed in 
consultation with stakeholders and form the basis for both public 
participation and administrative decisions. A robust up-front 
deliberative process provides the basis for legally and politically 
sustainable trade-off decisions. 
In addition, without institutions to address the long-term 
environmental consequences, it is unrealistic to expect that 
legislatures, agencies, or the general public will ever be 
comfortable with accepting long-term management for lower 
present costs—nor would that be a responsible course of action. 
An effective long-term stewardship program should demonstrate 
transparency concerning long- and short-term risks while 
practicing life-cycle accounting, documentation, identification of 
stewards, enforceability, redundancy, public involvement, 
sustainability, and flexibility and responsiveness to future 
conditions.62 Institutions for managing long-term stewardship 
programs will need to identify hazardous and nuclear waste 
disposal sites that have potential long-term effects on the 
environment (that is, nearly all of them), keep track of their 
condition and legal status, and possess the capacity to remedy (or 
cause others to do so) leaks, intrusions, or other environmental 
effects.63 
Few, if any, extant institutions have such capacities which can 
also be counted upon to last for decades or centuries into the 
future. At a minimum, such institutions would require a very clear 
sense of a long-term protective mission (like the National Park 
 
 60 Applegate & Dycus, supra note 6, at 10650–51. 
 61 COMM’N ON RISK CHARACTERIZATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 3, 6 
(Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996); See COMM. ON RISK-BASED 
APPROACHES FOR DISPOSITION OF TRANSURANIC AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE 
WASTE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK AND DECISIONS ABOUT DISPOSITION OF 
TRANSURANIC AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE 7 (National Academies 
Press 2005). 
 62 Applegate & Dycus, supra note 7, at 10644–45. 
 63 Id. at 10651–52. 
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Service, perhaps), which would provide the necessary incentive to 
continue stewardship activities for the long term. A clear mission 
might also permit such an institution plausibly to represent 
(loosely defined) future generations in present deliberations. Stable 
long-term funding, too, would be a necessity, and perhaps the 
waste tax suggested above could be used to create a fund for this 
purpose. 
C. Scaling Regulatory Authority to the Problem 
Professor Adler makes the case that the environmental effects 
of hazardous waste are almost entirely local.64 Whatever our 
worries are about leaking waste sites and spreading contamination, 
the direct impact of the problem is generally quite limited in 
geographic terms. Adler concludes from this that decisions about 
the disposal of hazardous waste are essentially local land use 
decisions—whether to place waste in a particular location, the 
level of risk to which the nearby population should be exposed, the 
design and waste acceptance criteria for the facility, and so on. 
There are several ways in which the management of 
hazardous waste is not simply a local problem, however. Waste is, 
as Professor Adler recognizes, itself an item of interstate—and, 
indeed, international—commerce, and he makes a special point of 
ensuring that interstate commerce in hazardous waste be protected 
against legal (the dormant Commerce Clause) and political 
(NIMBY) restraints. The irresponsible shipment of hazardous 
wastes to economically depressed parts of the United States or to 
developing countries that have little or no capacity for minimally 
appropriate management is therefore not a local problem at all, but 
a global problem that needs to be addressed at the national and 
supranational level. More closely related to the temporal issues 
that are our focus, efforts at waste minimization through product 
choice and design change will be undermined, at least to some 
degree, by the existence of localities which, for whatever reason, 
welcome substantial amounts of hazardous waste disposal. Nuclear 
waste policy, too, is national and international, inasmuch as efforts 
to encourage or discourage the use of nuclear power—to say 
nothing of nuclear weapons—are distinctly matters of national and 
international policy. Moreover, it is a cornerstone of U.S. nuclear 
 
 64 See Adler, supra note 2. 
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waste policy that widely distributed spent fuel is to be gathered 
into one or two national repositories for disposal. 
A more difficult problem of scale involves the intersection of 
the geographic limitations of the effects of hazardous waste and 
their temporal extensiveness. While the geographic effects of 
contamination may never extend beyond the residents of River 
City, all of the residents of River City will change across 
generations. Over the millennia that hazardous and nuclear wastes 
remain hazardous, the social and political organization of that 
place will change drastically. Decisions about the location and 
isolation measures made by River City today are surely more 
remote from the people of River City in 3000 or 4000 or 10,000 
C.E. than decisions made in Washington, D.C. today—and yet 
decisions to accept certain kinds of waste, to place them in certain 
locations, and to isolate them to a certain degree will directly affect 
those future generations. One cannot, of course, simply equate 
temporal and geographic distance. Nevertheless, the temporal 
dimension of these wastes at least suggests that a larger polity is 
affected by waste decisions.65 While it is by no means obvious that 
the larger polity is best represented by the federal, as opposed to 
(say) the relevant state government, there might be some 
advantage in making such decisions at some remove from the most 
immediate local concerns. 
Breaking the Logjam. As with trade-offs, the appropriate way 
to address the time scale of hazardous and nuclear waste 
management is through implementation of the principles of 
transparency and deliberation that the National Academy of 
Sciences has recommended in connection with risk regulation. In 
the long run, candid and complete disclosure of the known facts 
and uncertainties, and candid and complete acknowledgement of 
the relevant policy choices, will permit the kind of open 
deliberation that yields robust and lasting decisions. It is 
optimistic, but surely not utopian, to suggest that a decision 
making process that embodies these qualities would enjoy the kind 
of judicial and political deference to administrative judgment that 
currently eludes such judgments. A bureaucratic culture of 
suppressing scientific information or of dressing policy choices in 
 
 65 See Sinden, supra note 49, at 588–94 (describing the ways in which local 
land-use decisions can have wide-ranging impacts). 
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scientific clothing breeds the kind of distrust that causes courts, 
legislatures, and the general public to resist unwanted regulatory 
decisions to the last, and to insist on legislative directives 
(“substantial evidence”) and judicial doctrines (“hard look”) that 
contribute directly to the logjam. Thus, while there is much to be 
said for placing the essentially local aspects of hazardous waste 
management at the center of deliberations, the failure to 
acknowledge and analyze wider temporal implications—in 
particular, by the aggressive use of legal doctrines like the dormant 
Commerce Clause to foreclose legal and political objections—will 
only push the logjam a little farther downstream. 
D. Institutional Learning and the Conservation of Options 
The temporal dimension of hazardous and nuclear waste also 
suggests the utility of a new Breaking the Logjam principle. In any 
long-term effort, one must expect that over time we will come to 
understand the underlying problem better and will develop better 
ideas and capacities for addressing it. These improvements can 
only be implemented if the regulatory system is capable of 
learning and if present decisions leave options open for the future. 
Humility is the first reason to permit learning and retain 
options. Our ability to predict the future of physical locations or 
human technology is extraordinarily limited. It is hard to imagine 
how the human events and technologies of the Twentieth Century 
could have been predicted with any certainty in the Nineteenth. 
Indeed, it is the occasional good guess (H.G. Wells comes to mind) 
that stands out for its rarity. Without indulging in dystopic 
fantasies (Road Warrior scenarios in which legacy hazardous 
waste will be the least of humankind’s problems), it is fair to ask 
whether we will be able successfully to transfer knowledge of the 
location and dangers of hazardous waste to the future. Likewise, 
while technological optimism seems amply justified in general 
terms (the Twentieth Century being the outstanding example), it is 
a different matter to count on particular solutions to particular 
problems as the way to preserve options or ensure safety.66 
In addition to having humility about our ability to predict the 
future, we must respect the future and its inhabitants. As Professor 
 
 66 See James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-easy Case for 
Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1985). 
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Brown Weiss observes, we cannot predict the values of future 
generations any more than we can predict their technology or 
situation, and so we should seek to conserve options for future 
generations to choose from. Irreversible decisions are unavoidable, 
of course, and sometimes irretrievable solutions are the most 
appropriate ones. Deep geological disposal of nuclear waste, for 
example, is intended to be irretrievable and may well be the most 
responsible way to address this most difficult of problems. On the 
other hand, advocates of monitored retrievable storage argue that 
there are greater advantages to being able to revisit disposal 
choices and technologies in the future. Brown Weiss’s approach 
counsels caution (not inaction) in making irretrievable 
commitments. 
Conserving options into the future is of little use if regulatory 
systems are incapable of responding to changed conditions. Under 
the rubric of “reflexive environmental law,”67 and “adaptive 
management,”68 scholars have advocated legal regimes that adjust 
to new conditions. Professor Driesen proposes a similar approach, 
which he calls “economic dynamics.”69 Accepting that our 
understanding of consequences in the present is constrained, which 
sharply limits our ability to develop an adequate long-term 
analysis of, say, costs and benefits, economic dynamics counsels 
regulatory designs that adjust to change and encourage 
innovation—“learning while doing,” in Doremus’s phrase. 
Breaking the Logjam. Responses to hazardous and nuclear 
waste—and to any long-term environmental problem—must be 
adaptable wherever possible, so that we can take maximum 
advantage of what we do know now and be minimally dependent 
on our knowledge of the future. This calls for institutional 
structures that adjust and learn from experience, and for 
substantive decisions that conserve options to permit learning. In 
the depths of the Great Depression, President Franklin Roosevelt 
 
 67 See generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U.L. 
REV. 1227 (1995). 
 68 See Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in 
Natural Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 550–57 (2007) 
(describing adaptive management). 
 69 David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: Cost-
Benefit Analysis, Emissions Trading, and Priority-Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. 
REV. 501 (2003). 
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famously urged governmental experimentation: “It is common 
sense to take a method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try 
another.”70 Informal rulemaking, with its basic notice-and-
comment procedures,71 may be said to embody this approach. It 
allows agencies the widest possible range of inputs, the greatest 
flexibility in considering them, and the speediest path to the 
implementation of agency conclusions. It also allows agencies to 
experiment, to change course, to admit failure and try something 
else—above all, to learn from experience. 
This administrative process, while nominally the basis for 
most hazardous waste regulation, has “ossified”72 over time as the 
result of formal legislative mandate (so-called hybrid rulemaking), 
aggressive judicial review (the “hard look” approach73), executive 
analytical requirements (for example, Office of Management and 
Budget review), and changing agency culture. Some procedural 
complexity is inevitable to achieving a well-informed, 
participatory system of administration, but the clear objective 
should be full and public consideration based on available 
information, followed by a prompt agency decision and deferential 
judicial review. As with consideration of trade-offs, confidence in 
agency decisions reached in a simple and (relatively) speedy 
process would be justified by a strong initial process of agency 
deliberation; by the ready ability of the agency, using informal 
rulemaking as originally conceived, to rectify errors and adapt to 
new information or circumstances; and by a firm practice or legal 
requirement that agencies regularly review their decisions in terms 
of their stated goals.74 
 
 70 “The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands 
bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it. 
If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something. The 
millions who are in want will not stand idly by silently forever while the things 
to satisfy their needs are within easy reach.” President Franklin Roosevelt, 
Commencement Address at Oglethorpe University (May 23, 1932), available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/66/19/47019.html. 
 71 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). 
 72 See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992) (quoting former EPA 
General Counsel E. Donald Elliott). 
 73 Changing course, for instance, can be considered a warning sign of agency 
irrationality. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FTC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 
(D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 74 A review requirement is capable of abuse, of course, and so it must be 
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In sum, a long-term approach must assume that conditions 
will change and understanding improve; therefore, it must also 
provide for an agency to return to a decision multiple times and to 
respond nimbly to the changed circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
It is refreshing to have a discussion of environmental 
regulation, such as the one that Professors Stewart, Schoenbrod, 
and Wyman have initiated, that is couched in terms of principles—
not of absolute principles of right and wrong, but of principles that, 
as Professor Dworkin put it, “state[] a reason that argues in one 
direction, but [do] not necessitate a particular decision.”75 
Principles of this kind properly reflect the complexity and 
contingency of environmental decision making and the multiple 
goals that it seeks to serve. Principles remind us that simple 
formulas cannot provide real answers. The temporal dimension of 
hazardous and nuclear waste illustrates the power of principles. 
The Breaking the Logjam principles unquestionably have 
application to these wastes and point us in useful directions, but 
the underlying facts and the overarching goals are too complicated 
for formulaic application. A principle, moreover, “is flexible, 
interrelates with other principles, does not dictate a particular 
outcome, and can be subject to different interpretations.”76 The 
Breaking the Logjam principles do not provide a priori answers 
for every case, but instead they form the basis for a rich and 
deliberative analysis of what we know and do not know about a 
particular situation, and what we want to achieve and want to 
avoid. 
 
 
backed by adequate agency resources to undertake such reviews without 
compromising its on-going responsibilities, and it should not routinely be linked 
to so-called sunset provisions that terminate approaches without regard to their 
effectiveness. 
 75 Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 26 (1967). 
 76 Elizabeth Fisher, Precaution, Law and Principles of Good Administration, 
52(6) WATER SCI. & TECH. 19, 19 (2005) (discussing the precautionary 
principle); see also Elizabeth Fisher, Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: 
Developing a ‘Common Understanding’ of the Precautionary Principle in the 
European Community, 9 MAASTRICHT J. EUROPEAN & COMP. L. 9 (2002). 
